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Abstract: We study the degree of synchronization between formal- and informal-economy 
business cycles. Using a comprehensive database of informal activity that covers a wide 
range of informality measures from almost 160 countries over the 1990-2018 period, we 
report two major results. First, fluctuations in informal-sector output are strongly 
positively correlated with those in formal-sector output. In contrast, fluctuations in 
informal employment are largely uncorrelated with those in formal-sector output. Second, 
movements in the formal economy tend to spillover to the informal economy. Using a 
novel set of instrumental variables, we show that fluctuations in formal-sector output 
“cause” movements in informal-sector output. 
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In an average emerging market and developing economy (EMDE), the informal sector 
accounts for about one third of GDP, compared with about 18 percent of GDP in 
advanced economies (Figure 1). Its large size makes the informal economy a potential 
amplifier or dampener of business cycles that policy makers need to take into account 
when formulating policies. If the informal economy expands while the formal economy 
contracts, it may support household incomes and consumer demand during economic 
downturns and serve as a safety net (Loayza and Rigolini 2011). If the informal economy 
behaves procyclically (that is, grows during expansions in the formal economy), it could 
function as an auxiliary “growth engine” during economic expansions (Chen 2005; 
Dell’Anno 2008; Meagher 2013).   
In theory, the cyclical relationship between informal and formal sectors is ambiguous.2 
Some theoretical models have shown that the informal economy may absorb a larger 
share of workers as jobs become scarce in the formal sector during economic downturns 
(Bosch, Goni and Maloney 2007; Dix-Carneiro et al. 2021; Loayza and Rigolini 2011). 
Such behavior by the informal sector could facilitate economic recovery—by providing a 
potential supply of labor to the formal sector and preventing the hysteresis costs of 
unemployment—if re-entry into the formal sector is possible when the formal economy 
returns to expansion (Colombo, Onnis, and Tirelli 2016; IMF 2017). In contrast, if 
informal firms provide services as well as final and intermediate goods to the formal sector, 
formal and informal sectors move in tandem. In addition, informal-economy income can 
support formal-economy demand. In these circumstances, the informal economy would 
amplify macroeconomic fluctuations.3 
Empirical evidence on the behavior of the informal economy over the business cycle is 
also inconclusive. This has been attributed partly to different country characteristics and 
the roles of different economic shocks. After presenting a brief review of the literature on 
the cyclical behavior of the informal economy, we analyze the cyclical relationships 
between formal and informal sectors using multiple measures of informality for a large 
number of countries. In addition to studying the extent of synchronization between formal 
and informal economies, here we also investigate whether fluctuations in formal economy 
output “cause” fluctuations in output or employment in the informal economy via an 
instrumental variable approach. 
Our paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it is the first comprehensive 
analysis of the cyclical linkages between formal and informal sectors using multiple 
measures of informality for a large set of economies—about 160 economies, comprising 36 
advanced economies (AEs) and about 120 emerging markets and developing economies 
 
2 Some early research suggested that the degree of cyclicality of the informal economy depends on the 
measure of informality used and country characteristics.   
3 For cyclical linkages between the formal sector and informal sector, see Arvin-Rad et al. (2010), Docquier, 
Muller, and Naval (2017), Gibson (2005), Lubell (1991), Restrepo-Echavarria (2014), Roca, Moreno, and 
Sanchez (2001), and Schneider (1998).   
 
 
(EMDEs). It covers a long, recent period—1990-2018—and is the first study of the 
behavior of both output and employment in the informal economy as previous studies 
have focused on either one of these two variables. The comparison yields valuable insights 
into the cyclicality of labor productivity. 
Second, we focus on the absolute size of the informal economy, while earlier studies 
examined the informal economy only in relation to the formal economy. This allows for a 
more precise understanding of cyclical dynamics. Specifically, earlier studies examined the 
size of the informal economy relative to that of the formal economy without explaining 
the underlying mechanism. For instance, when the relative size of the informal sector rises 
during recessions, it could reflect an expanding informal economy or an informal economy 
that shrinks less than the formal economy. Some previous studies have interpreted the 
rising ratio as evidence for an expanding informal economy during recessions. A few 
previous studies of the procyclicality of informal output levels have been restricted to a 
small group of countries and either study solely output (Bajada 2003; Dell’Anno 2008; 
Giles 1997) or solely employment (Fiess, Fugazza, and Maloney 2010).   
Third, our paper is the first to document a causal link from formal-economy cyclical 
developments to the informal economy by using an instrumental variables approach. This 
improves on existing studies that have tested for basic Granger causality between formal 
and informal economy within individual countries. The previous Granger causality tests 
help to determine whether one time-series is useful in forecasting another. However, they 
do not test for “true” causality as instrumental-variable regressions are able to identify 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009), since omitted variables can generate spurious causality 
(Eichler 2009).   
We report two major results. First, we find that informal-economy output moves in step 
with formal output: informal-economy output movements are strongly positively 
correlated with formal-economy output movements. Hence, when earlier studies found 
that the share of the informal economy rose during formal-economy recessions, this 
reflected a slower absolute decline in informal than formal output rather than an absolute 
increase in informal activity. In addition, we find that informal employment largely 
behaves “acyclically.”  
Second, in an instrumental variable estimation, we show that the direction of causality 
runs from the formal economy to the informal economy. Specifically, our paper documents 
a causal link from fluctuations in formal-economy output to fluctuations in informal-
economy output. In terms of employment, such a causal link is not found: whereas 
informal output behaves procyclically, informal employment behaves acyclically. The 
latter may indicate that informal labor markets do not adjust in terms of employment 
status during economic cycles but in terms of wages or working hours (Guriev, Speciale, 
and Tuccio 2016; Meghir, Narita, and Robin 2015).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes past studies of the 
comovement between formal and informal business cycles, followed by Section 3 on the 
data and methodologies employed in the paper. Section 4 then presents evidence on the 
 
 
comovement of formal and informal economies. Section 5 further provides new estimates 
of the causal relationship between formal and informal economy business cycles and 
discusses potential explanations for the cyclical behavior of the informal economy. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of policy implications and directions for future 
research. 
2. Literature review: Linkages between formal and informal sectors  
The literature on the cyclical behavior of the informal economy offers mixed conclusions. 
Studies focusing on the share of the informal economy in total output or employment tend 
to find countercyclical behavior whereas studies focusing on output or employment levels 
tend to find procyclical behavior. The theoretical literature suggests that the nature and 
degree of cyclicality, mainly in the share of employment informality, depends on the type 
of shocks causing business cycle fluctuations and on the presence of labor market rigidities. 
This section summarizes this literature.4  
2.1 Informal economy as a countercyclical safety net  
The informal sector can serve as a buffer and safety net for the poor if it absorbs labor 
during recessions. This can facilitate an economic recovery provided that re-entry into the 
formal sector is possible when the formal economy returns to expansion (Colombo, Onnis, 
and Tirelli 2016; IMF 2017; Loayza and Rigolini 2011).  
Macroeconomic evidence. Studies that employ macro data suggest the informal economy 
can behave “countercyclically” in the sense that the share of informal employment rises 
during business cycle downturns. For example, one study reported that on average in 54 
economies during 1984-2008, a one-standard-deviation slowdown in GDP per capita 
growth (that is a slowdown of 3 percentage points a year) was associated with a short-
run increase in the share of self-employment in the total labor force by 1.2 percentage 
points, although with considerable cross-country heterogeneity (Loayza and Rigolini 2011).   
In one study, the correlation between informal employment and official GDP has been 
estimated as modestly negative (about -0.3), whereas the correlation between formal 
employment and formal output was strongly positive (Fernández and Meza 2015). A study 
that used electricity consumption as a proxy for total economic activity found that the 
informal economy expanded following banking crises in 48 economies over the 1984-2005 
period (Colombo, Onnis, and Tirelli 2016). Several studies have found that during 
economic downturns, the share of informal output tended to increase (Busato and Chiarini 
2004; Elgin 2012; Kaufmann and Kaliberda 1996).   
More procyclical fiscal policy in less developed economies with weaker institutions may 
contribute to the counter-cyclicality of informal activity. Fiscal policy tends to be more 
procyclical in countries with higher informality (Çiçek and Elgin 2011). In particular, 
 
4 Several recent studies argue that pervasive informality may influence the measured cyclicality of the formal 
economy. For example, models with a large and poorly measured informal sector can generate excess 
volatility of formal consumption relative to formal output—a common feature of business cycles in many 
EMDEs (Horvath 2018; Restrepo-Echavarria 2014).   
 
 
procyclical fiscal consolidation during recessions, including through higher taxes, may 
encourage more informal employment and output.   
Microeconomic evidence. Work-flow data for Brazilian metropolitan labor markets 
between 1983 and 2002 showed that the informal sector was able to absorb more labor 
during economic downturns as jobs became scarcer in the formal sector (Bosch, Goni, and 
Maloney 2007). The share of formal employment fell as formal-economy output contracted, 
in part because the rate at which workers found formal jobs plummeted while the rate at 
which they found informal jobs remained broadly stable (Bosch and Esteban-Pretel 2012). 
2.2 Informal economy as a “procyclical engine” of growth 
Since informal firms provide services, as well as final and intermediate goods to the formal 
sector, a positive correlation between formal and informal sector activity may emerge. In 
addition, informal-economy income can support formal-economy demand.5  
Macroeconomic evidence. In studies focusing on absolute output levels rather than the 
share of the informal economy, movements in informal-economy output have been found 
to be positively correlated with movements in formal-economy output in Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and a group of 19 Latin American economies (Bajada 2003; Dell’Anno 
2008; Giles 1997; Tedds and Giles 2000). In a group of developing countries, episodes 
where relative demand or productivity shocks expanded the nontradables sector (as 
opposed to the tradables sector) were associated with higher informal employment shares 
(hence, pro-cyclicality; Fiess, Fugazza, and Maloney 2010). In Brazil and Mexico, higher 
separation rates from informal jobs and a large drop of the formal job finding rate may 
induce labor outflows from the informal sector during recessions (Bosch and Maloney 
2008). A theoretical model establishes procyclical informal-formal sector linkages when 
formal firms sub-contract labor-intensive stages of production to the informal sector 
(Arvin-Rad, Basu, and Willumsen 2010). 
Microeconomic evidence. In firm-level data for India, formal and informal sector 
employment have been found to be positively correlated, in part because subcontracting 
by formal-sector firms to informal firms contributes to job creation in the informal sector 
(Moreno-Monroy, Pieters, and Erumban 2014).6 An examination of data from Indian 
manufacturing firms showed that the gross value added of several predominantly informal 
industries was positively correlated with that of the formal sector as well as with foreign 
 
5 For linkages between the two sectors, see Arvin-Rad, Basu, and Willumsen (2010), Lubell (1991), and 
Moreno-Monroy, Pieters, and Erumban (2014). For linkages focusing on income support, see Docquier, 
Müller, and Naval (2017), Eilat and Zinnes (2002), Gibson (2005), Kanbur (2017), Schneider (1998), and 
World Bank (2014). Although the relationship between formal and informal sectors may be symbiotic in 
the short run, in the long-run pervasive informality may create poverty traps and stymie economic 
development.   
6 In an earlier study focusing on two European countries, it was found that at least two-thirds of the income 
earned in the informal economy was immediately spent in the formal economy, providing a considerable 
stimulus for it (Schneider 1998).  
 
 
direct investment (FDI). This may be indicative of technological spillovers to both formal 
and informal sectors (Beladi, Dutta, and Kar 2016).  
2.3 Factors influencing the cyclicality of the informal economy 
Some studies have sought to reconcile the mixed evidence by pointing to country 
characteristics that would generate different degrees of procyclicality. Others have pointed 
to different kinds of shocks that would lead to different types of cyclical linkages.   
Cross-country heterogeneity. There is considerable cross-country heterogeneity in the 
degree of pro-cyclicality of informal employment. It has been found to be higher when 
informality was greater (Loayza and Rigolini 2011), when informal employment was more 
common (Shapiro 2014), or when there were stronger informal-formal sector linkages such 
as through subcontracting (Mbaye, Benjamin, and Gueye 2017; Moreno-Monroy, Pieters, 
and Erumban 2014).   
Sources of shocks causing business cycles. The informal economy can move procyclically 
or countercyclically, depending on the sectoral origin of the shocks that generate business 
cycles in the presence of wage rigidities, especially in the formal sector (Fiess, Fugazza, 
and Maloney 2010; Leyva and Urrutia 2020). Positive relative demand or productivity 
shocks to the non-tradable sector, especially services, where the share of informal 
employment tends to be higher could increase informal employment, generating 
procyclicality in informal employment, especially when combined with wage rigidities in 
the formal sector.7 Conversely, in the presence of wage rigidities, a negative shock to the 
tradable sector would expand informal (non-tradables) employment and thus appear as 
countercyclical.  
3. Data and methodology8 
The empirical analysis here relies on the database of measures for informality developed 
in Elgin et al. (2021). It applies a battery of statistical tests to establish, first, comovement 
between formal output and measures of informal activity and, second, to analyze the 
direction of causality.   
3.1 Data: informality measures 
Two model-based estimates stand out in their country-year coverage and movement over 
time and, hence, make them more suitable for business cycle analyses than other estimates 
on informal economic output (Elgin et al. 2021). These two types of model-based 
estimates are the multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) estimates (based on 
Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010) and the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) 
estimates (Elgin et al. 2021).  Hence, we focus on the MIMIC estimates and the DGE 
estimates.9 
 
7 See Ohnsorge, Okawa, and Yu (2021) for a discussion about sectoral distribution in the informal economy. 
Informality tends to be higher in labor-intensive service sectors, which are largely non-tradable.  
8 See Table A.1 for a summary of descriptive statistics on all variables used here. 
9 The correlation of the DGE measure does not occur by construction (see Annex A for details).   
 
 
The MIMIC model is a structural equations models that can be applied to estimate the 
size of informal economic activity. Elgin et al. (2021) replicate the most cited MIMIC 
study, Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010), to estimate the share of informal output 
in percent of official GDP. Both economic and institutional indicators are used in the 
MIMIC model. The resulting estimates are available annually for 160 countries (including 
36 AEs) over the period 1993-2018.  
The DGE model estimated in Elgin et al. (2021) considers how households allocate labor 
between formal and informal economies within each period and how the allocation 
changes over time. In comparison to other methods, the DGE approach stands out in its 
comprehensive country-year coverage, transparent economic reasoning, and its 
applicability in policy experiments and projection (Loayza 2016). Annual DGE estimates 
are available for 158 economies (including 36 AEs) for 1990-2018.  
These measures of informal output are complemented with self-employment as a proxy 
indicator of informal employment (La Porta and Shleifer 2014). Annual data on shares of 
self-employment are available for 179 economies (including 36 AEs) between 1990 and 
2018.  
All measures of informal activity are defined in levels of output or levels of employment, 
rather than as shares of total activity or employment as is standard practice in the 
business cycle literature (for example, Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2012; Fernández 
and Meza 2015). Data for formal output are from the Penn World Table 9.1 and the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) (in 2011 U.S. dollars; data from Penn World Table 
9.1 were expanded using WDI) (see Table A.1 for details). The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter is used to detrend the time series with the smoothing parameter set to 100.  All 
exercises rely on detrended logarithms of these levels. The findings are robust to using 
annual growth of formal and informal output and employment or to using the Baxter-
King filter to detrend series. 
3.2 Empirical methodology 
Comovement. To quantify the comovement of formal output with the various measures 
of informality, we employ a wide range of measures, including correlation, factor models, 
coincidence of turning points and business cycle phases, and probit and linear regression 
models (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2012; Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 2003; Restrepo-
Echevarria 2014). The methodological details are discussed below. 
First, we follow Restrepo-Echevarria (2014) in computing the lag and contemporaneous 
correlations of official GDP and output (and employment) in the informal sector. These 
basic correlations illustrate whether the formal and informal economies are moving 
together and whether the formal economy is leading the informal economy. Since 
employment may move differently from economic output, we also include formal 
employment in our analysis. The results are summarized in Table 1. 
Then, we apply an alternative method of estimating business cycles comovement, which 
is a dynamic factor model (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 2003). The model decomposes the 
 
 
fluctuations in formal and informal economies into a dynamic common factor and an 
idiosyncratic factor. If the dynamic common factor can explain a large portion of the 
variance in formal and informal economic output (employment), the degree of 
comovement between formal and informal business cycles is high. Specifically, the 
dynamic common factor model has the following form (Stock and Watson 2011): 10 𝒀𝒕 = 𝛽𝑓𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡; 𝑓𝑡 = ∅(𝐿)𝑓𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡 
where 𝒀𝒕 is a vector of variables that contains official GDP, DGE-based and MIMIC-
based informal output estimates, formal employment, and informal employment. 𝑓𝑡 is the 
dynamic common factor, which follows an AR (1) process. 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜇𝑡 are error terms 
(i.d.d.). The dynamic common factor model is estimated for each country in our sample 
with sample statistics reported in Table 2. 
To illustrate the synchronization between informal and formal-economy business cycles, 
we compute the coincidence of formal and informal business cycle phases, which are 
identified as follows. First, Bry and Boschan (1971)’s algorithm is applied to identify the 
turning points of business cycles (i.e. peaks and troughs), using the procedure of Harding 
and Pagan (2012). For annual data, we define peaks (troughs) as occurring at time t 
whenever output (employment) growth is positive (negative) in t but negative (positive) 
in t+1 (Berge and Jorda 2011).11 Second, we classify business cycle phases as defined in 
Claessens et al. (2012). Using the turning points identified in the first step, recessions are 
the periods from peak to trough while expansions are the periods from trough to peak. 
The coincidence of these phases is shown in Table 3 (as a robustness check, we also report 
the coincidence of these turning points in Table A.2). 
Lastly, some regression models are used to understand the comovement of formal output 
with the various measures of informality. Using the business cycle phases and turning 
points identified above, a probit regression model is estimated to examine whether the 
probability of the informal economy being in (or starting) a recession increases when the 
formal economy is in a recession. The probit model has the following form:   
Pr (ISRECit = 1) = ф(α + βFSit + θXit + πi + μt + ϵit ), 
where ISRECit is a dummy variable that equals one when the informal sector in country 
i and year t is in recession, and zero otherwise.12 FSit is a dummy representing recession 
in the formal economy, and Xit is a vector of control variables. Following Elgin and 
Oztunali (2012 and 2014), Xit includes the annual growth rates of real investment and 
domestic credit to the private sector. These control variables are included as they 
 
10 Robustness tests for longer lags indicate that the coefficients for additional lags of the common factor are 
insignificant. All data series are detrended and standardized before estimation. Additional results are 
available upon request. 
11 A censoring rule imposes that, in the event of multiple peaks (troughs) within a five-year window around 
a peak (trough), the highest (lowest) peak (trough) is picked.   
12 For the probit model on the start of informal recessions, ISRECit is a dummy variable that equals one 
when the informal sector in country i and year t is in the start of a recession, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
influence the fluctuations in both formal and informal economies (for instance, Ferreira-
Tiyaki, 2008; Elgin and Oztunali, 2014; La Porta and Shleifer 2014). Data for investment 
are provided by PWT 9.1, updated with data from World Development Indicators (WDI 
2020), and credit data are obtained from WDI. All regressions include country dummies 
(πi) and year dummies (μt) to control for macro trends across countries in a certain year 
and factors that are country specific.  
“Casual” relationship. As a second step, we use an instrumental variable two-stage least 
squares (IV-2SLS) approach to estimate the direction of causality between formal output 
and measures of informal activity. We consider instrumental variables that affect formal-
economy output but do not directly influence informal-economy output: movements in 
trade-related variables and changes in government consumption. Being concentrated in 
the non-tradable sector (Fiess, Fugazza, and Maloney 2010), the informal economy is 
unlikely to be influenced by movements in trade-related variables directly. In addition, 
government consumption includes all government current expenditures for purchases of 
goods and services (including compensation of employees), without covering transfers 
such as social benefits and subsidies. Governments are typically restricted, by legislation 
and regulation, from purchasing goods and services directly from the informal economy. 
As governments purchase goods and services from the formal economy, changes in 
government consumption lead to fluctuations in the formal economy without affecting 
the informal economy directly. Therefore, movements in trade-related variables and 
changes in government consumption can be interpreted as exogenous instruments that 
directly affect the formal economy without directly influencing the informal economy.  
Data on movements in trade-related variables and changes in government consumption 
are obtained from WDI (2020). Trade-related variables include terms of trade and exports 
of goods and services (at constant 2010 U.S. dollars). Government consumption captures 
general government final consumption expenditure (at constant 2010 U.S. dollars). These 
measures—as well as all the output and employment measures—are transformed into 
cyclical components as deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered trend with a 
smoothing parameter of 100. To further make sure that the causal direction only runs 
from the formal economy to the informal economy, cyclical movements in formal GDP 
are lagged in the following regressions.13 
The IV-2SLS regression model has the following form: 
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼1 + 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜽𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                         (1st Stage) 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡−1̂ + 𝜽𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                        (2nd Stage) 
 
13 The results are robust to using annual growth rates of these variables. They are also robust when cyclical 
movements in formal GDP are not lagged. They are available upon request. 
 
 
In the first stage, the lagged cyclical component of formal-economy output (𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) is the 
dependent variable, while the lagged trade-related variables and government consumption 
in country i (𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1) are the explanatory variables.14 The regression results of the first 
stage are used to obtain the estimated cyclical component of formal economy output  𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡−1̂ , which is included as the explanatory variable in the 2nd stage. 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡−1̂  is used to 
explain the cyclical components of informal-economy output or informal employment (𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) 
in year t. The coefficient estimates 𝛽 measures the magnitude and direction of the impact 
of fluctuations in the formal business cycle on the informal economy. In both stages, a 
vector of control variables (𝑿𝒊𝒕), country fixed effects (𝜋𝑖) and year fixed effects (𝜇𝑡) are 
controlled for. The vector of control variables (𝑿𝒊𝒕) are the same as in the probit model, 
which includes the growth rates of domestic credit to the private sector and real 
investment (see Table A.1 for detailed variable descriptions).  
4. Synchronization of formal and informal economy cycles   
A battery of statistical exercises suggests that informal output is strongly positively 
correlated with formal output, hence behaves in a procyclical manner. In contrast, 
informal employment is largely unrelated to formal output movements, hence behaves in 
an acyclical manner.   
Correlations. Contemporaneously, informal-economy output movements are highly and 
statistically significantly correlated with formal-economy output movements (Table 1). 
Formal employment is also positively and statistically significantly correlated with 
formal-economy output, although considerably less strongly, particularly in EMDEs, 
whereas informal employment is largely uncorrelated with formal-economy output, again 
particularly in EMDEs. Lag correlations are considerably smaller than contemporaneous 
correlations, suggesting that informal output responds to formal-economy output 
fluctuations within a year.15  
Common factor approach. For each country, a common factor is extracted from informal- 
and formal-sector output as well as informal and formal employment, in a dynamic factor 
model as depicted in section 3.2. The results are broadly in line with the correlations 
discussed above. On average, the common factor explains about 40 percent of the variance 
in both formal-economy output and DGE-based informal-economy output (Table 2). It 
explains somewhat less (24 percent) of the variance in MIMIC-based informal-economy 
output, in part because MIMIC estimates tend to be more stable than DGE estimates as 
a result of the reliance of the former measure on slow-moving country characteristics such 
as economic and business freedom indices. The common factor also explains a modest 
fraction of movements in formal employment, especially in advanced economies. In 
contrast, informal employment does not appear to share a common factor with formal 
 
14 Results are similar when annual growth rates are used instead of cyclical deviations from trend. Results 
are available upon request. 
15 In EMDEs, however, lag correlations are statistically indistinguishable from contemporaneous correlations.   
 
 
employment or with informal or formal-economy output in either advanced economies or 
EMDEs.   
Coherence in business cycle phases and turning points. Formal- and informal-sectors 
typically share the same business cycle phases (Table 3). In more than 90 percent of 
country-year pairs, formal and informal output are in the same business cycle phase. This 
coincidence of business cycle phases is considerably less pronounced for employment than 
for output. Formal employment and formal output share the same business cycle phases 
in 75 percent of all country-year pairs, while informal employment is in the same phase 
as formal output in 54 percent of country-year pairs. Similarly, between 30 and 70 percent 
(using MIMIC or DGE, respectively) of turning points (peak or trough) of formal output 
business cycles coincide with turning points of informal output business cycles, whereas 
informal employment turning points coincide about 10 percent of the time with formal-
economy output turning points (see Table A.2 for details). 
Econometric approaches. A probit regression is used to estimate the probability of the 
informal economy being in recession at the same time as the formal economy is. Indeed, 
the probability of informal output being in recession is statistically significantly higher 
when formal output is in a recession, even after controlling for country and year fixed 
effects as well as investment and credit growth (Table A.3). On average, the probability 
of informal output being in recession is higher by about 25 percentage points when formal 
output is in recession than when formal output is not in recession.16 Similar results pertain 
to the probability of a new recession starting in the informal sector when the formal 
economy is in recession (Table A.4). Again, this contrasts with the finding that the 
probability of informal employment declining is little affected by a formal-economy 
contraction. 
5. Causal linkages between formal- and informal-economy cycles 
The results described in the previous section suggest a strong correlation between formal 
and informal economies. Some previous studies reported strong evidence of Granger 
causality running from the formal economy to the informal economy in individual 
countries, and mild evidence of reverse causality in some cases (Bajada 2003; Giles 1997; 
Giles, Tedds, and Werkneh 2002). However, Granger causality does not establish “true” 
causality and ignoring reverse causality could lead to biased estimation results (Angrist 
and Pischke 2009). Hence, here we employ a novel approach with an instrumental 
variables estimation to test for the direction of causality. The results based on this 
approach suggest that formal economy output fluctuations “truly” cause informal-
economy output fluctuations.   
 
16 Probabilities for the global sample need not to be near the average of the advanced economy and EMDE 
sample because of different year fixed effects.   
 
 
5.1 Baseline results 
In the baseline model, formal-economy output is instrumented using government spending 
and two trade-related variables: the cyclical components of the terms of trade and real 
exports. Being largely concentrated in the non-tradable sector, the informal economy is 
unlikely to be highly influenced directly by movements in trade-related variables. In 
addition, government spending is typically restricted, by legislation and regulation, from 
purchasing goods and services from the informal economy. Therefore, movements in 
trade-related variables and changes in government consumption can be interpreted as 
exogenous instruments that directly affect the formal economy without directly 
influencing the informal economy.   
The baseline results shown in Table 4 confirm that formal-economy output fluctuations 
in the previous year, as instrumented by lagged trade-related terms and government 
consumption, “cause” fluctuations in the informal economy in the following year. On 
average, a 1 percent increase in formal-economy output “causes” a 0.4-0.8 percent 
expansion in the following year in informal-economy output and formal employment. This 
impact does not differ materially between advanced economies and EMDEs. In contrast, 
such formal-economy output fluctuations do not cause significant fluctuations in informal 
employment, especially in EMDEs (Table 4).   
5.2. Robustness exercises 
We conduct several robustness exercises. First, we check the robustness of the baseline 
results to alternative model specifications by instrumenting only with either trade-related 
variables or government consumption. Second, we use system GMM (Generalized Methods 
of Moments) to address potential endogeneity bias. Third, we use an alternative variant 
of the DGE measures to test for robustness to different modelling assumptions in the 
construction of the DGE estimates. Lastly, we repeat our exercise for shares of the 
informal economy in output and employment to ensure consistency with previous 
estimates in the literature.   
Different sets of instrumental variables. To remove the potential endogeneity of 
government consumption in the case of MIMIC, we estimate results using trade-related 
instrumental variables (terms of trade and export growth) only (Table 5). The estimated 
impact of lagged formal-economy output fluctuations on informal-economy output and for 
formal employment is (statistically) in line with the estimated impact shown in Table 4. 
Specifically, a 1 percent increase in formal-economy output (statistically significantly) in 
year t-1 again raises informal-economy output by 0.4-0.9 percent in year t, depending on 
the informal-economy output measure chosen. The effect is somewhat larger in advanced 
economies than in EMDEs. Again, there is no significant impact on informal employment, 
either in EMDEs or in advanced economies.17 Similar results are found when using changes 
in government consumption alone as instruments (See Table A.5). 
 
17 The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic suggest that the instruments 
are strong instruments.  
 
 
Endogeneity bias (system GMM). As an alternative way to address endogeneity bias, we 
apply system GMM to estimate the impact of official GDP on informal output, formal 
employment and informal employment. The results are strongly in line with baseline 
findings. As shown in Table 6, a 1 percent rise in formal economy output significantly 
increases output in the informal sector in the following year by 0.4-0.8 percent but no 
significant response from informal employment (similar results were found in Table A.6 
when using a fixed-effect model). 
Alternative DGE estimates. DGE estimates of informal output in part depend on 
benchmark estimates and assumptions about productivity growth in the informal economy 
(Elgin et al., 2021). We test for the robustness of our results to these assumptions by 
using another set of DGE estimates that are calibrated using a series of survey-based self-
employment data (see Annex B for calibration details). This approach also avoids the 
assumption that informal productivity growth is the weighted average of formal-economy 
capital and productivity growth. Thus, this estimation approach weakens the link between 
informal and formal output due to the model assumptions in Elgin and Oztunali (2012). 
Table 7 confirms the baseline findings that fluctuations in formal-economy output cause 
informal output to move in the same direction and almost the same magnitude. On 
average, informal output expands significantly by 0.5-0.8 percent, especially in EMDEs, 
when formal-economy output rises by 1 percent in the previous year. While the results 
are less significant when government consumption is the only instrumental variable, the 
results are largely robust across different sets of instrumental variables. 
Shares of the informal economy. Here we redo the exercises in Tables 1, 4 and 5 using the 
share of informal output (in percent of official GDP) and the share of formal and informal 
employment (in percent of total employment).18 These robustness checks ensure the 
consistency between our findings and previous estimates in the literature (e.g. Loayza and 
Rigolini 2011). As expected, both shares of informal output and shares of informal 
employment are found to be significantly negatively correlated with formal-economy 
output (except in advanced economies when using DGE estimates), while shares of formal 
employment are positively correlated (Table A.7). The regression results show that the 
share of informal output contracts significantly by 0.1-0.4 percentage points of GDP, on 
average, when formal-economy output expands by 1 percent in the previous year (Tables 
A.8 and A.9). 
5.3 Explaining the cyclicality of the informal sector  
The previous sections have established that informal-economy output and formal 
employment behave “procyclically,” in the sense of responding to formal-economy output 
fluctuations significantly and positively. Meanwhile, informal employment acts 
“acyclically” in the sense of not significantly and systematically responding to formal-
economy output fluctuations. This accounts for the rising share of informal employment 
 
18 All shares of informal output and shares of formal and informal employment are in logs and Hodrick-
Prescott-filtered, as in Table 4. When shares are not logged but Hodrick-Prescott-filtered, the results remain 
the same and will be provided upon request.  
 
 
during formal-economy recessions documented by studies like Loayza and Rigolini 
(2011).19   
There are at least wo possible reasons explaining why informal employment behaves 
acyclically. First, informal employment may respond to different shocks from informal 
output and formal employment, or it may respond differently to the same shocks. As an 
example of the latter, the informal labor market, being more flexible than the formal 
sector, may respond by reducing hours worked per person or by lowering wages, rather 
than by reducing the number of employed.20 A second possible reason is that while job 
separation rates rise during recessions in both formal and informal sectors, the rate at 
which workers find formal jobs plummets while that at which they find informal jobs 
remains broadly stable (Bosch and Esteban-Pretel 2012; Bosch, Goni, and Maloney 2007).  
6. Conclusions  
Our paper presents a wide variety of approaches that document the strong comovement 
of informal-economy output with formal-economy output, caused by movements in formal 
output, but the lack of such comovement for informal employment. This suggests that 
although output in the informal economy behaves procyclically and, therefore, may 
amplify aggregate output fluctuations, the unresponsiveness of informal employment to 
the business cycle may provide a buffer for household incomes by ensuring continuity of 
employment in the informal economy (Ferreira-Tiryaki 2008; Roca, Moreno, and Sánchez 
2001). 
The resilience of informal employment in the face of business cycle swings, juxtaposed 
with the weaker development levels associated with informality (Ohnsorge, Okawa, and 
Yu 2021), suggests a trade-off. In the short run, informal employment can provide a safety 
net during business cycles; in the long term, however, the informal sector can exacerbate 
poverty and stymie development (Docquier, Müller, and Naval 2017). Policy measures 
that—deliberately or inadvertently—reduce informality and thus benefit longer-term 
development and poverty reduction could, therefore, usefully be accompanied by a 
strengthening of official social safety nets to protect vulnerable population groups from 
the short-term costs of the loss of the unofficial safety net provided by the informal sector. 
The necessity of strengthening the resilience of the informal sector is particularly relevant 
in the context of the COVID-19-induced recession (Ohnsorge and Yu 2021). If 
comovement between formal and informal output reflects synergies, such as through 
subcontracting, policy measures aimed at curtailing informal activity could disrupt formal 
activity. These effects could be mitigated if measures that reduce informality were 
accompanied by greater labor and product market flexibility in the formal sector that 
facilitates the absorption of informal-sector participants (World Bank 2019).  
 
19 Similarly, it was shown that foreign interest rates are inversely and significantly related to formal job 
creation but insignificantly related to informal job creation and destruction, resulting in the counter-
cyclicality of the share of informal employment (Leyva and Urrutia 2020). 
20 For discussions of these arguments, see Guriev, Speciale, and Tuccio (2016), Loayza and Rigolini (2011), 
Maloney (2004), and Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2015).  
 
 
The results reported in this paper point to several promising areas for future research. 
First, the cyclical behavior of other features of the informal economy could usefully be 
examined. For example, if greater flexibility of wages or hours worked is what ensures 
acyclical behavior of informal employment despite procyclical informal output, then 
informal wages or hours of employment should be particularly procyclical. It would be 
useful to establish whether this is the case. Second, the channels through which formal-
economy business cycles affect the informal economy could be further explored and 
quantified. This includes the degree of interconnectedness between formal and informal 
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Annex A. Theoretical proof for whether the procyclicality of the DGE estimates is by 
construction 
The official GDP has the following form: 𝑌𝐹𝑡 = 𝐴𝐹𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝑁𝐹𝑡1−𝛼 
where 𝑌𝐹𝑡is the output in the formal sector in year t, 𝐴𝐹𝑡 is the productivity in the formal 
sector, 𝐾𝑡 is the capital stock available in year t, and 𝑁𝐹𝑡 is the employment in the formal 
sector in year t. 
The production function for informal output is assumed to have the following form: 𝑌𝐼𝑡 = 𝐴𝐼𝑡𝑁𝐼𝑡𝛾 . 
where 𝑌𝐼𝑡 is the output in the informal sector in year t, 𝐴𝐼𝑡  is the productivity in the 
informal sector, and 𝑁𝐼𝑡is the employment in the informal sector. As assumed in Elgin 
and Oztunali (2012). 𝐴𝐼𝑡̇ = 12 (𝐾?̇? + 𝐴𝐹𝑡̇ ) and 𝑁𝐼𝑡 is a function of 𝐴𝐹𝑡 and 𝐾𝑡. To simplify 
the discussion, it is assumed that 𝐴𝐼𝑡 = 12 (𝐴𝐹𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡) + 𝑐, where c is a constant. 𝑁𝐼𝑡 has the 
following form: 21 
𝑁𝐼𝑡 = { 𝛾𝐴𝐼𝑡(1−𝜏𝑡)(1−𝛼)𝐴𝐹𝑡 [ 1𝛽−1+𝛿𝛼(1−𝜏𝑡)𝐴𝐹𝑡] 𝛼1−𝛼}
11−𝛾
. 
Since 𝐴𝐼𝑡 and 𝑁𝐼𝑡 are functions of 𝐴𝐹𝑡 and 𝐾𝑡, 𝑌𝐼𝑡 can be expressed as a function of 𝐴𝐹𝑡 
and 𝐾𝑡.we know that the comovement between 𝑌𝐼𝑡 and 𝑌𝐹𝑡 can be only driven by shocks 
in 𝐴𝐹𝑡 and 𝐾𝑡. 22 Since 𝜕𝑌𝐹𝑡𝜕𝐾𝑡 > 0 and 𝜕𝑌𝐹𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 > 0, the positive correlation between 𝑌𝐹𝑡 and 𝑌𝐼𝑡 
could be driven by construction if 
𝜕𝑌𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 > 0 and 𝜕𝑌𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐾𝑡 > 0. Therefore, the values of 𝜕𝑌𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 and 𝜕𝑌𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐾𝑡  will be discussed below. 
Frist, 
𝜕𝑌𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐾𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑡𝛾 𝜕𝐴𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐾𝑡 + 𝐴𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝛾𝑁𝑖𝑡𝛾−1 ∗ 𝜕𝑁𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐾𝑡 , where 𝜕𝑁𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐾𝑡 > 0 and 𝜕𝐴𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐾𝑡 = 12>0.  
Hence,  
𝝏𝒀𝑰𝒕𝝏𝑲𝒕 > 𝟎. 
Second, it is easy to derive that 𝜕𝑌𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑡𝛾 𝜕𝐴𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 + 𝐴𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝛾𝑁𝐼𝑡𝛾−1 ∗ 𝜕𝑁𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 
=𝑁𝐼𝑡𝛾 (12 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐴𝐼𝑡𝑁𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝜕𝑁𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡) 
where 
 
21 See Elgin and Oztunali (2012) for the definitions of the parameters used here. 
22 Assume that shocks in 𝑁𝐹𝑡are not related to shocks in 𝐾𝑡 nor in 𝐴𝐹𝑡. 
 
 
𝜕𝑁𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 = Ω ∗ 𝐴𝐼𝑡𝛾1−𝛾(𝐴𝐹𝑡) 1−(1−𝛼)(1−𝛾) ∗ 11 − 𝛾 ∗ [12 − 1(1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝐴𝐼𝑡𝐴𝐹𝑡] 
and  Ω = { 𝛾(1−𝜏𝑡)(1−𝛼) [ 1𝛽−1+𝛿𝛼(1−𝜏𝑡)] 𝛼1−𝛼}
11−𝛾
. 
Since 𝛼 = 0.36 and 𝐴𝐼𝑡 = 12 (𝐴𝐹𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡) + 𝑐, we know that [12 − 1(1−𝛼) ∗ 𝐴𝐼𝑡𝐴𝐹𝑡] < 0 and  𝜕𝑁𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 <0. This gives us  𝜕𝑌𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑡𝛾 ∗ [12 + 𝛾1−𝛾 ∗ (12 − 1(1−𝛼) ∗ 𝐴𝐼𝑡𝐴𝐹𝑡)]. Hence, if 𝐴𝐼𝑡𝐴𝐹𝑡 falls below (1−𝛼)2𝛾 ≈0.75, 𝜕𝑌𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 turns from positive to negative. 
Since the comovement between 𝑌𝐼𝑡 and 𝑌𝐹𝑡 are largely driven by the assumption that 𝐴𝐼𝑡̇ = 12 (𝐾?̇? + 𝐴𝐹𝑡̇ ), the DGE model is re-estimated by benchmarking 𝑁𝑖𝑡 to survey-based 
self-employment. This gives the estimates of 𝐴𝐼𝑡  and subsequently 𝑌𝐼𝑡 The regression 
results for IV-2SLS models using DGE estimates benchmarked to self-employment are 
largely in line with those shown in the main text (Table 7). 
Annex B.  Calibrating DGE estimates using survey-based self-employment data 
As shown in annex A and Elgin and Oztunali (2012), the employment in the informal 
sector, 𝑁𝐼𝑡 has the following form: 
𝑁𝐼𝑡 = { 𝛾𝐴𝐼𝑡(1−𝜏𝑡)(1−𝛼)𝐴𝐹𝑡 [ 1𝛽−1+𝛿𝛼(1−𝜏𝑡)𝐴𝐹𝑡] 𝛼1−𝛼}
11−𝛾     Eq(1). 
After transforming Eq (1), 𝐴𝐼𝑡 can be expressed as follows: 𝐴𝐼𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑡1−𝛾(1 − 𝜏𝑡)(1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝐹𝑡𝛾 [ 1𝛽 − 1 + 𝛿𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝐴𝐹𝑡]
𝛼1−𝛼      Eq(2). 
Following Loayza and Rigolini (2011) and Fiess et al. (2010), data on self-employment 
provided by Elgin et al. (2021) is used as estimates for 𝑁𝐼𝑡 and calculate 𝐴𝐼𝑡 using Eq (2). 
Following the earlier literature, 𝛼 is assumed to be equal to 0.36 while 𝛿 takes the country 
average of the depreciation rates reported in Penn World Tables 9.1 (PWT, expanded 
using World Bank 2020 and WDI). Following Ihrig and Moe (2004), 𝛾 takes 0.425. Capital 
stock (𝐾𝑡 ) and formal employment (𝑁𝐹𝑡 ) are obtained from PWT 9.1. Assuming a 
balanced budget for the government, 𝜏𝑡 is obtained as the share of government spending 
in GDP reported in PWT 9.1.  
 
 
Rewriting the production function of the informal sector (𝑌𝐼𝑡) using Eq(2), we find 𝑌𝐼𝑡to 
be a function of 𝐴𝐹𝑡 and 𝑁𝐼𝑡: 
𝑌𝐼𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑡)(1 − 𝛼)𝛾 [1𝛽 − 1 + 𝛿𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝑡)]
𝛼1−𝛼 ∗ (𝐴𝐹𝑡) 11−𝛼 
Which gives 
𝜕𝑌𝐼𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡>0. Since 𝜕𝑌𝐹𝑡𝜕𝐴𝐹𝑡 > 0, it is possible that the DGE estimates will move 
procyclically in the presence of large shocks in formal productivity while other type of 
shocks is absent. However, when other type of shocks also occurs at the same time, 𝑌𝐼𝑡 
may not move procyclically. For instance, if 𝑁𝐼𝑡 and 𝑁𝐹𝑡experienced shocks in different 





Figure 1 Formal and informal economy business cycles 
A. Shares of informal economy B. Changes in shares of informal 
economy during formal economy 
upturns and downturns in EMDEs 
  
C. Output growth during formal economy 
upturns and downturns in EMDEs 
D. Employment growth during formal 
economy upturns and downturns in 
EMDEs 
  
Sources: Penn World Table 9.1; World Bank.  
Note: Data are for 1990-2018. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; 
EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; FEMP = formal employment (proxied by total employment 
excluding self-employment); LICs = low-income countries; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model 
estimates; SEMP = self-employment. “Downturn” refers to growth rates of official GDP below zero, while “upturn” 
refers to growth rates of official GDP equal to or above zero. In B-D, *** indicates that the group average is significantly 
different from zero at the 10 percent level.   
A. Bars show unweighted group averages for the latest year available, with the whiskers showing +/-1 standard 
deviation.  
B. Shares of informal output (in percent of official GDP) and informal employment (in percent of total employment) 
are first-differenced and demeaned to capture detrended annual changes. Bars show unweighted group averages of 
detrended annual changes in shares of informal output/informal employment. Results for DGE-based estimates are 
shown in tenths.   
C.D. Levels of output and employment in both formal and informal economies are logged, first-differenced and demeaned 
to capture detrended annual growth rates. Bars show unweighted group averages of detrended annual growth rates of 



























































Table 1 Lag and contemporaneous correlations 
  Cyclical components 
 Formal output  t(-2) t(-1) t(0) 
Informal output Full sample  0.19*** 0.63*** 0.98*** 
(DGE-based estimates) AEs  0.11*** 0.65*** 0.99*** 
 EMDEs  0.20*** 0.63*** 0.98*** 
Informal output Full sample  0.28*** 0.55*** 0.78*** 
(MIMIC-based estimates) AEs  0.29*** 0.52*** 0.69*** 
 EMDEs  0.28*** 0.55*** 0.79*** 
Formal employment Full sample  0.07*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 
 AEs  0.30*** 0.63*** 0.69*** 
 EMDEs  0.05** 0.11*** 0.13*** 
Informal employment Full sample  -0.01 0.01 0.03* 
 AEs  0.01 0.14*** 0.21*** 
  EMDEs  -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Notes: AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; 
EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and 
multiple causes model estimates. Significant levels are * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each 
cells shows the correlation between the cyclical components of formal-economy output (in logs, 
of year t(-2), t(-1) and t(0)) and the cyclical components of informal-economy output, formal 
employment (i.e. total employment excl. self-employment) and informal employment proxied by 




Table 2 Dynamic factor model: variance explained by the common factor  
(In percent of total variance) 
    Median Mean S.E. 
Formal output Full sample 40.49 40.37 1.71 
 AEs 39.73 37.75 2.70 
  EMDEs 41.32 41.41 2.13 
Informal output Full sample 40.18 39.25 1.75 
(DGE-based estimates) AEs 39.78 37.61 2.68 
  EMDEs 40.18 39.89 2.21 
Informal output Full sample 22.38 24.10 1.69 
(MIMIC-based estimates) AEs 12.22 18.43 2.86 
  EMDEs 23.47 26.35 2.02 
Formal employment Full sample 9.11 14.40 1.36 
 AEs 20.21 22.11 2.71 
  EMDEs 5.61 11.35 1.45 
Informal employment Full sample 2.56 5.75 0.78 
 AEs 3.35 5.12 1.09 
  EMDEs 2.36 5.99 1.00 
Notes: AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; 
EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and 
multiple causes model estimates. All data series are transformed into cyclical components and 
standardized before the estimations. In the first two columns, the median (mean) fraction of 
variance explained by the common dynamic factor in each group is reported. We assume that in 
each country, official GDP, DGE, MIMIC, formal employment (i.e. total employment excl. Self-
employment) and informal employment (i.e. self-employment) share one common dynamic factor 
with AR(1) process (suggested by the estimation results). The sample standard errors are shown 
in the last column. Data are for 1990-2018. 
 
 
Table 3 Coincidence of formal and informal business cycle phases  
(In percent of total country-year pairs) 
 
Phase of the informal business cycle 
(DGE-based estimates) 
Phase of the informal business cycle 
(MIMIC-based estimates) 
 Recession Expansion Total Recession Expansion Total 
Phase of the formal business 
cycle       
Recession 99 1 100 83 17 100 
Expansion 5 95 100 6 94 100 
In same phase 96  91  
 Phase of the formal employment cycle Phase of the informal employment cycle 
 Recession Expansion Total Recession Expansion Total 
Phase of the formal business 
cycle       
Recession 72 28 100 46 54 100 
Expansion 24 76 100 44 56 100 
In same phase 75  54  
Note: Data are for 1990-2018. DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates. Business 
phases and turning points are identified as in Elgin et al. (forthcoming). Recessions are the periods from peak to trough while expansions are the periods from 
trough to peak (Claessens et al. 2012).  The cells show the percentage of formal “recession” (“expansion”) phases that are accompanied with informal “recession” 
(“expansion”) phases. “In same state” show the percentage of cases where formal and informal business cycles are in the same phase. Formal employment is total 




Table 4 IV-2SLS regression: Baseline model 
 
DGE MIMIC Formal employment Informal employment  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
2nd stage Dep Var: Informal Output/Employment  
Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
Official GDP 0.55*** 0.75*** 0.51*** 0.42*** 0.65*** 0.40*** 0.56** 0.49*** 0.54* -0.06 0.11 -0.09  
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.25) (0.09) (0.30) (0.16) (0.14) (0.20) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 29.81*** 14.10*** 24.44*** 30.58*** 13.99*** 25.00*** 36.25*** 14.01*** 29.10*** 36.25*** 14.01*** 29.10*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat 192.96 100.52 141.77 203.31 102.65 148.74 228.24 99.56 155.95 228.24 99.56 155.95 
Obs 2,947 637 2,310 2,847 629 2,218 2,263 626 1,635 2,263 626 1,635 
R-squared 0.50 0.79 0.47 0.37 0.62 0.35 0.05 0.60 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.04 
1st stage Dep Var: Official GDP 
Terms of trade 0.09*** 0.45*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.46*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.46*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.46*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) 
Export  0.13** 0.07 0.12* 0.15** 0.07 0.13* 0.23*** 0.06 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.06 0.22***  
(0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) 
Gov consumption 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stats 17.06*** 26.57*** 13.78*** 16.84*** 26.89*** 13.53*** 24.39*** 26.36*** 19.01*** 24.39*** 26.36*** 19.01*** 
Obs 2,947 637 2,310 2,847 629 2,218 2,263 626 1,635 2,263 626 1,635 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; EMDEs 
= emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates. First-stage F-stat show whether the concerning variable 
is a weak instrumental variable (IV), with a higher value suggesting a stronger IV.  The equation is exactly identified.  Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic shows the results 
for under-identification test, where a rejection shows the instrument is relevant. Significant Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic also shows that the used instrument is strong. 
Formal employment is total employment (excl. self-employment). Informal employment is proxied by self-employment. All dependent variables, official GDP, export and 
government consumption are cyclical components (in logs) obtained using HP-filter. Terms of trade is cyclical component (in percent of trend) obtained using HP-filter. 
Official GDP, government consumption, terms of trade and export are lagged to deal with the endogeneity issue. The control variables include the growth rates of domestic 
credit to private sector and real investment. Constant term is included in all regression models. See Section 3.2 for detailed model specifications Full sample with period 




Table 5 IV-2SLS: Trade-related instrumental variables 
  DGE MIMIC Formal employment Informal employment 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
2nd stage Dep Var: Informal Output/Employment  
Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
Official GDP 0.59*** 0.85*** 0.55*** 0.37*** 0.47*** 0.36*** 0.41* 0.45*** 0.37 0.02 0.06 -0.00 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.21) (0.12) (0.25) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 30.04*** 12.68*** 24.80*** 29.98*** 12.59*** 24.47*** 36.83*** 12.70*** 29.80*** 36.83*** 12.70*** 29.80*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat 219.91 68.93 165.86 228.36 68.25 171.71 233.65 65.81 166.72 233.65 65.81 166.72 
Obs 3,009 637 2,372 2,918 629 2,289 2,329 626 1,701 2,329 626 1,701 
R-squared 0.50 0.79 0.47 0.36 0.62 0.34 0.06 0.60 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.04 
1st stage Dep Var: Official GDP 
Terms of trade 0.16** 0.16 0.14** 0.17*** 0.17 0.15** 0.25*** 0.15 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.15 0.22*** 
 (0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) 
Export 0.15*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.16***  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stats 22.75*** 23.46*** 18.42*** 23.35*** 22.99*** 18.78*** 31.23*** 23.08*** 24.84*** 31.23*** 23.08*** 24.84*** 
Obs 3,009 637 2,372 2,918 629 2,289 2,329 626 1,701 2,329 626 1,701 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; EMDEs 
= emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates. First-stage F-stat show whether the concerning variable 
is a weak instrumental variable (IV), with a higher value suggesting a stronger IV.  KP (Kleibergen-Paap) rk LM statistic shows the results for under-identification test, 
where a rejection shows the instrument is relevant. Significant CD (Cragg-Donald) Wald F statistic also shows that the used instrument is strong. Formal employment 
is total employment (excl. self-employment).  Informal employment is proxied by self-employment. All dependent variables, official GDP, export and government 
consumption are cyclical components (in logs) obtained using HP-filter. Terms of trade is cyclical component (in percent of trend) obtained using HP-filter. Official GDP, 
government consumption, terms of trade and export are lagged to deal with the endogeneity issue. The control variables include the growth rates of domestic credit to 
private sector and real investment. Constant term, country and year dummies are included in all regression models and in both stages of regressions. See Section 3.2 for 




Table 6 System GMM regression 
  DGE MIMIC Formal employment Informal employment  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
  Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
Official GDP 0.68*** 0.75** 0.72*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.38*** 0.36 0.36*** 0.06 -0.10 -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.34) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.27) (0.11) (0.09) (0.30) (0.12) 
Investment growth 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Credit growth 0.02*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Obs 4,074 892 3,182 3,781 834 2,947 3,070 858 2,190 3,070 858 2,190 
Number of countries 157 35 122 154 35 119 148 35 112 148 35 112 
Number of instruments 204.00 135.00 135.00 198.00 79.00 153.00 110.00 84.00 110.00 110.00 84.00 110.00 
AR(1) 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.41 0.27 0.02 0.09 0.04 
AR(2) 0.51 0.33 0.70 0.51 0.11 0.70 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model 
estimates; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates. Formal employment 
is total employment (excl. self-employment).  Informal employment is proxied by self-employment. All dependent variables and official GDP are cyclical 
components (in logs) obtained using HP-filter. The control variables include the growth rates of domestic credit to private sector and real investment. 





Table 7 IV-2SLS: DGE estimates benchmarked to self-employment 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
2nd stage Dep Var: Informal Output (DGE estimates benchmarked to self-employment) 
 Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
Official GDP 0.56** 0.46*** 0.62** 0.77** 0.62*** 0.83** 0.43 0.02 0.55* 
  (0.24) (0.16) (0.30) (0.31) (0.23) (0.39) (0.27) (0.27) (0.31) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 32.97*** 14.01*** 25.59*** 31.74*** 12.70*** 24.42*** 27.10*** 7.51*** 20.99*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat 239.49 99.56 155.36 201.97 65.81 135.58 338.75 73.41 219.28 
Obs 2,054 626 1,427 2,090 626 1,463 2,381 857 1,523 
R-squared 0.08 0.40 0.07 0.08 0.40 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.08 
1st stage Dep Var: Official GDP  
Terms of trade 0.25*** 0.06 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.15 0.25*** 
   
 (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) 
   
Export 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.18*** 
   
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
   
Government consumption 0.19*** 0.46*** 0.16*** 
   
0.26*** 0.35*** 0.23*** 
  (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) 
   
(0.03) (0.10) (0.03) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stats 38.24*** 26.36*** 28.32*** 29.13*** 23.08*** 21.61*** 61.43*** 12.74*** 45.60*** 
Obs 2,054 626 1,427 2,090 626 1,463 2,381 857 1,523 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model 
estimates; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates. First-stage F-stat show 
whether the concerning variable is a weak instrumental variable (IV), with a higher value suggesting a stronger IV.  The equation is exactly identified.  
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic shows the results for under-identification test, where a rejection shows the instrument is relevant. Significant Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic also shows that the used instrument is strong. The dependent variable (DGE estimates benchmarked to self-employment), official GDP, 
export and government consumption are cyclical components (in logs) obtained using HP-filter. Terms of trade is cyclical component (in percent of trend) 
obtained using HP-filter. Official GDP, government consumption, terms of trade and export are lagged to deal with the endogeneity issue. The control variables 
include the growth rates of domestic credit to private sector and real investment. Constant term is included in all regression models. See Section 3.2 for 
detailed model specifications. Full sample with period over 1990-2018 is used here.  
 
 
Annex Tables.  
 
Table A.1 Table of Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Definition Source Number of 
countries 
Time  Mean Median 
DGE-based estimates  DGE model-based estimates for 
informal output (in percent of 
official GDP) 
Elgin et al. (2021) 158 1990-2018 31.8 31.6 
MIMIC-based estimates  MIMIC model-based estimates for 
informal output (in percent of 
official GDP) 
Elgin et al. (2021) 160 1993-2018 33.3 33.5 
Informal employment Self-employment (in percent of 
total employment). 
Elgin et al. (2021) 179 1990-2018 31.0 25.8 
Official GDP Real GDP at constant 2011 
national prices (in mil. 2011 US$) 
PWT 9.1, expanded using World 
Bank (2020) and WDI. 
181 1990-2018 425948.4 44369.0 
Terms of trade Net barter terms of trade index 
(2000=100) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
196 1990-2018 112.4 100.9 
Export Exports of goods and services (in 
constant mil. 2010 US$) 
World Development Indicators 184 1990-2018 94734.4 12200.3 
Gov consumption General government final 
consumption expenditure (in 
constant mil. 2010 US$) 
World Development Indicators 173 1990-2018 66502.8 5114.0 
Investment growth Gross fixed capital formation 
(annual growth rates, %) 
PWT 9.1, expanded using WDI. 190 1990-2018 0.07 0.04 
Credit growth Credit growth rates World Development Indicators 171 1990-2018 0.08 0.06 
Total employment Number of persons engaged (in 
millions) 
PWT 9.1, expanded using World 
Bank (2020), ILO, Haver 
Analytics and other sources. 





Table A.2 Synchronization of turning points in formal and informal business cycles 
(In percent of country-year pairs with turning points) 
  
Turning points of formal 
business cycles 
Turning points of informal output business cycle Turning points of informal output business cycle 
(DGE-based estimates) (MIMIC-based estimates) 
Trough Peak Trough Peak 
Trough 71 0 37 1 
Peak 0 67 2 36 
 Turning points of the formal employment cycle Turning points of the informal employment cycle 
Turning points of formal 
business cycles 
Trough Peak Trough Peak 
Trough 14 3 8 10 
Peak 3 19 8 8 
Notes: Data are for 1990-2018. Trough and peaks are identified as in Elgin et al. (2021) where the BBQ method is used to identify those turning points. The cells 




Table A.3 Probit: formal and informal recessions 
Dependent variable: 
In an informal recession 
DGE MIMIC Formal employment Informal employment 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
 Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
In a formal recession 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.35*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.01 0.05 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
Investment growth  -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.30* -0.03 -0.11*** -0.89*** -0.04* -0.14*** -0.48*** -0.10*** 
  (0.02) (0.14) (0.01) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.03) (0.16) (0.02) (0.04) (0.15) (0.03) 
Credit growth -0.01 -0.19** -0.01 -0.00 -0.44* 0.01 -0.07** -0.20 -0.06* 0.06* -0.02 0.07** 
  (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.25) (0.02) (0.03) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) 
Observations 3,495 632 2,640 2,381 372 1,872 3,196 728 2,341 3,185 855 2,330 
Pseudo R-sq 0.62 0.71 0.60 0.43 0.40 0.46 0.18 0.37 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.15 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data are for 1990-2018. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = 
dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model 
estimates.  Average marginal effects are reported in the cells with corresponding standard errors reported in brackets. Country and year dummies are included. 
Recessions are identified as in Elgin et al. (forthcoming), where BBQ method is used to identify peaks and troughs of business cycles and recessions are defined as 
the period from peak to trough (Claessens et al. 2012). Formal employment shows “total employment (excl. self-employment)”.  Informal employment is proxied by 
“self-employment”. The control variables include the growth rates of domestic credit to private sector and real investment. The probit model has the following form: 𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛷(𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜽𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡), where 𝐼𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals one when the informal sector in country i and year t is in 
recession, and zero otherwise. FSit is a dummy representing recession in the formal economy, and 𝑿𝐢𝐭 is a vector of control variables. Following Elgin and Oztunali 
(2012 and 2014), 𝑿𝐢𝐭 includes the annual growth rates of real investment and domestic credit to the private sector. All regressions include country dummies (𝜋𝑖) and 




Table A.4 Probit: formal recession and the start of informal recessions 
Dependent variable: 
Start an informal recession 
DGE MIMIC Formal employment Informal employment 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
 Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
In a formal recession 0.27*** 0.39*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.37*** 0.20*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.08*** -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
Investment growth  0.02* 0.35*** 0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.00 -0.09** -0.54*** -0.06* -0.11*** -0.17 -0.10*** 
  (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.04) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.18) (0.03) 
Credit growth -0.01 -0.19* -0.00 0.00 -0.29* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.06** 0.07 0.06** 
  (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) 
Observations 3,096 409 2,354 2,307 281 1,823 2,902 482 2,153 2,749 637 2,027 
Pseudo R-sq 0.61 0.74 0.59 0.40 0.32 0.45 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data are for 1990-2018.  AEs = advanced economies; DGE = 
dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates. 
Average marginal effects are reported in the cells with corresponding standard errors reported in brackets. Country and year dummies are included. Recessions are 
identified as in Elgin et al. (forthcoming), where BBQ method is used to identify peaks and troughs of business cycles and recessions are defined as the period from peak 
to trough (Claessens et al. 2012). Formal employment shows “total employment (excl. self-employment)”.  Informal employment is proxied by “self-employment”. The 
control variables include the growth rates of domestic credit to private sector and real investment. The probit model has the same form as in table A.3 but differs in the 





Table A.5 IV-2SLS regression: Fiscal actions in the formal economy 
  DGE MIMIC Formal employment Self-employment 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
2nd stage Dep Var: Informal Output/Employment 
 Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
Official GDP 0.54*** 0.63*** 0.52*** 0.56*** 0.98*** 0.54*** 0.71** 0.64*** 0.71* -0.17 -0.08 -0.17 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.15) (0.10) (0.33) (0.11) (0.38) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 12.03*** 7.43*** 10.53*** 12.35*** 7.29*** 10.80*** 29.03*** 7.51*** 22.94*** 29.03*** 7.51*** 22.94*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat 239.14 57.29 173.92 255.07 57.63 186.54 304.48 73.41 205.80 304.48 73.41 205.80 
Obs 3,357 882 2,475 3,197 826 2,371 2,596 857 1,737 2,596 857 1,737 
R-squared 0.52 0.75 0.50 0.45 0.12 0.46 0.01 0.53 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 
1st stage Dep Var: Official GDP  
Government consumption 
0.13*** 0.29*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.30*** 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.35*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.35*** 0.18*** 
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stats 11.50*** 9.74*** 10.24*** 11.55*** 9.16*** 10.30*** 38.07*** 12.74*** 30.18*** 38.07*** 12.74*** 30.18*** 
Obs 3,357 882 2,475 3,197 826 2,371 2,596 857 1,737 2,596 857 1,737 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; 
EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates. First-stage F-stat show whether the 
concerning variable is a weak instrumental variable (IV), with a higher value suggesting a stronger IV. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic indicates that the test 
for under-identification is rejected and, hence, the instrumental variable is relevant. The significant Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic also suggests that the used 
instrument is strong.  Formal employment shows “total employment (excl. self-employment)”.  Informal employment is proxied by “self-employment”. All dependent 
variables, official GDP and government consumptions are cyclical components (in logs) obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott-filter. Official GDP and government 
consumptions are lagged to deal with the endogeneity issue. The control variables include the growth rates of domestic credit to private sector and real investment. 
Data are for 1990-2018. 
 
 
Table A.6 Fixed-effect estimator regressions 
 DGE MIMIC Formal employment Informal employment 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
  Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
Official GDP  0.60*** 0.83*** 0.58*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.24*** 0.50*** 0.18*** 0.03 0.21*** -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Investment growth  0.03*** 0.11*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02*** -0.00 0.04*** -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Credit growth  0.03*** 0.01* 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** -0.00 0.01* -0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.03 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 4,074 892 3,182 3,781 834 2,947 3,070 858 2,190 3,070 858 2,190 
Number of countries 157 35 122 154 35 119 148 35 112 148 35 112 
R-sq 0.46 0.77 0.44 0.39 0.52 0.39 0.03 0.55 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.01 
Adj. R-sq 0.45 0.76 0.43 0.39 0.50 0.38 0.02 0.53 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; 
EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates. All dependent variables and official (real) 
GDP are cyclical components (in logs) obtained using HP-filter. Formal employment shows “total employment (excl. self-employment)”.  Informal employment is 
proxied by “self-employment”. Full sample with period over 1990-2018 is used here. The fixed-effect model estimated here has the following form:𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +𝜽𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the cyclical component of informal GDP or employment derived using the Hodrick-Prescott-filter, and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 is the Hodrick-
Prescott-filtered cyclical component of official GDP. The cyclical component of official GDP is lagged to deal with endogeneity. 𝑿𝐢𝐭 is a vector of control variables, 
including the annual growth rates of real investment and domestic credit to the private sector. Data for investment is provided by PWT 9.1, spliced with data from 




Table A.7 Lag and contemporaneous correlations of shares 
  Cyclical components 
  Formal output t(-2) t(-1) t(0) 
Informal output shares Full sample -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.06*** 
(DGE-based estimates, in logs) AEs -0.18*** 0.22*** 0.49*** 
 EMDEs -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.10*** 
Informal output shares Full sample -0.08*** -0.25*** -0.42*** 
(MIMIC-based estimates, in logs) AEs -0.05* -0.36*** -0.63*** 
 EMDEs -0.08*** -0.23*** -0.40*** 
Formal employment shares Full sample 0.02 0.04** 0.05*** 
(in logs) AEs 0.16*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 
 EMDEs 0.02 0.04** 0.05** 
Informal employment shares Full sample -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
(in logs) AEs -0.15*** -0.21*** -0.17*** 
  EMDEs -0.05** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
Notes: significant levels are * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium 
model estimates; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes 
model estimates. Each cells shows the correlation between the cyclical components of formal-economy output (in logs, of year 
t(-2), t(-1) and t(0)) and the cyclical components of informal output in percent of official GDP, formal employment (i.e. total 
employment excl. self-employment) in percent of total employment and informal employment proxied by self-employment in 





Table A.8 IV-2SLS regression: Baseline model (shares of the informal economy) 
 
DGE MIMIC Formal employment Informal employment  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
2nd stage Dep Var: Informal Output/Employment  
Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
Official GDP -0.04*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.11*** 0.43* 0.07*** 0.48* -0.20 -0.38*** -0.16  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.24) (0.03) (0.28) (0.17) (0.14) (0.20) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KP rk LM stat 29.81*** 14.10*** 24.44*** 30.58*** 13.99*** 25.00*** 26.24*** 14.01*** 29.10*** 36.25*** 14.01*** 29.01*** 
CD Wald F stats 192.81*** 100.52 141.77 203.31 102.65 148.74 228.24 99.56 155.95 228.24 99.56 155.95 
Obs 2,947 552 2,310 2,847 629 2,218 2,263 626 1,635 2,263 541 1,635 
R-squared 0.13 0.31 0.13 0.10 0.63 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.05 
1st stage Dep Var: Official GDP 
Terms of trade 0.09*** 0.34*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.46*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.46*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.35*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) 
Export  0.13** 0.09 0.12* 0.15** 0.07 0.13* 0.23*** 0.06 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.08 0.22***  
(0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) (0.16) (0.08) 
Gov consumption 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stats 17.06*** 13.91*** 13.78*** 16.84*** 26.89*** 13.53*** 24.39*** 26.36*** 19.01*** 24.39*** 26.36*** 19.01*** 
Obs 2,947 552 2,310 2,847 629 2,218 2,263 626 1,635 2,263 541 1,635 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; 
EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates.  First-stage F-stat show whether the 
concerning variable is a weak instrumental variable (IV), with a higher value suggesting a stronger IV. The equation is exactly identified.  Kleibergen-Paap (KP) rk 
LM statistic shows the results for under-identification test, where a rejection shows the instrument is relevant. Significant Cragg-Donald (CD) Wald F statistic also 
shows that the used instrument is strong. Formal employment is total employment (excl. self-employment). Informal employment is proxied by self-employment. All 
dependent variables (in shares of official GDP or in percent of total employment), official GDP, export and government consumption are cyclical components (in 
logs) obtained using HP-filter. Terms of trade is cyclical component (in percent of trend) obtained using HP-filter. Official GDP, government consumption, terms of 
trade and export are lagged to deal with the endogeneity issue. The control variables include the growth rates of domestic credit to private sector and real investment. 




Table A.9 IV-2SLS regression: Trade-related instrumental variables (shares of the informal economy) 
  DGE MIMIC Formal employment Informal employment 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
2nd stage Dep Var: Informal Output/Employment  
Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs Full AEs EMDEs 
Official GDP -0.02 0.06 -0.03* -0.16*** -0.36*** -0.13*** 0.30 0.08** 0.33 -0.09 -0.31* -0.05 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) (0.24) (0.19) (0.17) (0.23) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KP rk LM stat 30.04*** 8.92*** 24.80*** 29.98*** 12.58*** 24.47*** 36.83*** 12.70*** 24.47*** 36.83*** 12.70*** 24.47*** 
CD Wald F stats 219.91 68.92 165.86 228.36 68.26 171.71 233.65 65.81 171.71 233.65 65.81 171.71 
Obs 3,009 637 2,372 2,918 629 2,289 2,329 626 1,701 2,329 626 1,701 
R-squared 0.13 0.35 0.13 0.09 0.60 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.05 
1st stage Dep Var: Official GDP 
Terms of trade 0.16** 0.17 0.14** 0.17*** 0.17 0.15** 0.25*** 0.15 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.15 0.22*** 
 (0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) 
Export 0.15*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.16***  
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
With controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stats 22.75*** 13.94*** 18.42*** 23.35*** 22.99*** 18.78*** 31.23*** 23.08*** 18.78*** 31.23*** 23.08*** 18.78*** 
Obs 3,009 569 2,372 2,918 629 2,289 2,329 626 1,701 2,329 626 1,701 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model estimates; 
EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators and multiple causes model estimates. First-stage F-stat show whether the 
concerning variable is a weak instrumental variable (IV), with a higher value suggesting a stronger IV. KP (Kleibergen-Paap) rk LM statistic shows the results for 
under-identification test, where a rejection shows the instrument is relevant. Significant CD (Cragg-Donald) Wald F statistic also shows that the used instrument 
is strong. Formal employment is total employment (excl. self-employment).  Informal employment is proxied by self-employment. All dependent variables (in shares 
of official GDP or in percent of total employment), official GDP, and export are cyclical components (in logs) obtained using HP-filter. Terms of trade is cyclical 
component (in percent of trend) obtained using HP-filter. Official GDP, terms of trade and export are lagged to deal with the endogeneity issue. Controls and 
detailed model specifications are as shown in Table 4. Constant term, country and year dummies are included in all regression models and in both stages of 
regressions. Full sample with period over 1990-2018 is used here. When DGE-based estimates are used in AEs, four outlier countries are dropped: LTU, LVA, EST, 
and SVK. 
